June 5, 2019

The Honorable Lamar Alexander, Chairman
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee
United States Senate
428 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Patty Murray, Ranking Member
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee
United States Senate
428 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Submitted electronically via LowerHealthCareCosts@help.senate.gov

SUBJECT: Lower Health Care Costs Act

Dear Chairman Alexander and Ranking Member Murray,

The American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS) and the Congress of Neurological Surgeons (CNS), representing more than 4,000 practicing neurosurgeons in the United States, thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on your draft legislation, the “Lower Health Care Costs Act.” Americans continue to struggle with rising health care costs, including high deductibles and other out-of-pocket expenses. As such, a balanced solution for cost-sharing between patients, physicians and health plans is a priority for organized neurosurgery.

Patients deserve access to the physicians of their choice, which at times may require seeking care from out-of-network physicians. Unfortunately, the current health care delivery system, with its arcane rules, narrow networks, and lack of transparency, often leaves patients vulnerable. As physicians, we can and must do better, to assure that our patients are not left with medical bills that can soar into the thousands of dollars, leaving them financially devastated. The AANS and the CNS, therefore, applaud your effort to tackle the issue of unanticipated medical bills as part of your larger health care costs and transparency legislation. We also appreciate your willingness to work with the medical community to refine your bill, as we have some significant concerns about several sections of the draft. Our comments will focus on issues related to unanticipated medical bills, provider network directories and timely bills for patients, and we urge you to make changes to reflect our comments,

NEUROSURGERY’S POSITION ON OUT-OF-NETWORK CARE

In formulating legislation to prevent the practice of so-called “surprise billing,” it is essential to understand the origin of these unanticipated medical bills. When insured patients are treated in the hospital, they should be confident in the knowledge that their health insurance will cover them. Unfortunately, a growing number of these patients are finding out too late that their coverage is far less comprehensive than they thought. Increasingly, insurers are making unsuspecting patients responsible for additional payments of covered services provided by hospital-based physicians who are not in their insurer’s network. Insurers further exacerbate this problem by enticing consumers to enroll in plans with ever-growing deductibles and ever-narrowing networks of providers.
It should be recognized that these are intentional business decisions by the insurers that allow them to reduce costs by shifting significantly more of the cost-sharing burden onto patients and by limiting the pool of physicians in their networks to those who agree to contract at greatly reduced rates that may be well below market value. Since the insurance industry is intensifying its efforts to narrow networks further and force more physicians out-of-network, we believe a fair and equitable solution to the out-of-network balance billing issue should be developed that protects unsuspecting patients from facing significant financial hardships simply because an out-of-network physician provided the medical services they needed at that moment. Legislation should foster an environment where commercial payers have an incentive to broaden the network of physicians within their plans, instead of narrowing their networks. Legislation that establishes fair and equitable payment from commercial payers to physicians for out-of-network care creates that incentive. A broader network diminishes the need for out-of-network care and thereby unanticipated medical bills.

The AANS and the CNS believe that the following shared principles of consensus should apply in all situations, whether the health plans are regulated by the states or federal government.

1. **Adopt network adequacy standards.** Insurers must meet appropriate network adequacy standards including, but not limited to, an adequate ratio of emergency physicians, hospital-based physicians, and on-call specialists and subspecialists to patients, as well as geographic and driving distance standards and maximum wait times. Provider directories must be accurate and updated regularly to be useful to patients seeking care from in-network providers.

2. **Physicians want to participate in health plan networks.** The vast majority of physicians, including neurosurgeons, want to participate in-network with insurance companies, but can only do so when insurers negotiate in good faith for fair reimbursement.

3. **Limit patient responsibility and keep patients out of the middle.** Patients who unknowingly receive treatment from an out-of-network hospital-based physician should be held harmless and not be financially penalized by an unanticipated gap in their insurance coverage. Rather they should only be responsible for in-network cost-sharing rates. So patients are not burdened with payment rate negotiations between insurers and providers, physicians should be provided with direct payment/assignment of benefits from the insurer.

4. **Increase transparency for patients.** Insurers’ high-deductible plans transfer more unexpected costs to patients who often choose options based on monthly premium costs without fully realizing the magnitude of their out-of-pocket expenses. The influx of large gaps in insurance coverage or surprise bills in this environment is as much the result of surprise coverage gaps, as it is balance billing. Insurers must clearly inform their enrollees of the limits of their coverage and, before scheduled procedures, provide enrollees with reasonable and timely access to in-network physicians. In addition, all patients who choose in advance to obtain scheduled care from out-of-network physicians, hospitals or other providers should be informed before receiving care about their anticipated out-of-pocket costs. When scheduling services for patients, providers should be transparent about their own anticipated charges, and insurers should be transparent about the amount of those charges they will cover.

5. **Medicare is not an appropriate payment benchmark.** Medicare is not an appropriate benchmark for determining out-of-network payment. Medicare amounts are politically driven to reimburse medical services for a specific population based on federal budgetary and regulatory constraints. Such a methodology does not determine appropriate payment in other contexts, such as payment for commercially insured services. Furthermore, Medicare payment rates have become increasingly inadequate in covering overhead costs and are not market rates.
6. **In-network rates are not an appropriate payment benchmark.** Participating provider contractual rates are not an appropriate benchmark for determining out-of-network payment. Contracted rates are negotiated rates for which the insurer promises consideration in exchange for access to a discounted price. If insurers can pay contractual rates for out-of-network services, there is no incentive for them to negotiate in good faith for fair reimbursement and in fact, this would serve only as motivation for insurers to drive down contractual rates even further.

7. **Out-of-network payments should include physician charges.** Basing out-of-network payments on reasonable physician charges for the same service in the same geographic area is vastly superior to any methodology based on a contrived Medicare rate or a rate completely under the control of the insurance company. The FAIR Health database is an example of a database of physician charges that is geographically specific, completely transparent, and independent of the control of either payers or providers. Utilizing the 80th percentile of the FAIR Health database to determine the minimum benefit standard would exclude the highest outlier physician charges from consideration and ensure that out-of-network payment is reflective of truly reasonable charges. Implementation of such a system would substantially decrease, if not eliminate balance billing, while simultaneously creating an incentive for commercial payers to increase their network.

8. **Arbitration should be permitted to resolve out-of-network billing disputes.** Health plans should be required to pay physicians a commercially reasonable rate within 30 days. If either the physician or health plan is dissatisfied with that amount, they should privately settle on a payment amount or resolve the dispute using a “baseball-style” arbitration process that bases payment on the usual and customary cost of the service referenced from an independent medical claims database.

9. **EMTALA limits any discussions of costs and insurance status.** All persons and entities involved in providing and financing health care have an obligation of transparency to patients and health care consumers. However, any discussion of transparency in the emergency setting must recognize that federal requirements under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) statute provide that patients seeking emergency care have unfettered access to a diagnostic evaluation and stabilizing treatment without regard to their ability to pay, thus appropriately restricting any discussion of costs and insurance status until a patient is stabilized.

10. **A prudent layperson standard should be recognized.** Patients who are seeking emergency care should be protected under the “prudent layperson” legal standard as established in state and federal law, without regard to prior authorization or retrospective denial for services after emergency care is rendered.

**SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS**

With these principles in mind, we turn to some specific observations and recommendations regarding your draft legislation.

**Sec. 101. Protecting patients against out-of-network deductibles in emergencies** and **Sec. 102. Protection against surprise bills**

Generally speaking, the AANS and the CNS support the provisions contained in these sections. We agree with you that patients should be held harmless and must not be financially penalized for receiving unanticipated care from an out-of-network provider — whether the unanticipated medical bill stems from
emergencies or scheduled care from providers that the patients cannot reasonably choose. In these situations, patients should be held harmless and only be responsible for the amount they would have paid in-network, including any deductibles and other cost-sharing amounts. We cannot impose a burden on patients who are facing an emergency or are sick to determine whether a particular facility or provider is within their plan’s network. Regarding out-of-network services furnished after the patient has been stabilized following an emergency, we also believe it is reasonable for the patient to be provided information regarding the network status of any health care provider for care that may be required following the stabilization of the medical emergency, and if the notice is not given, the patient will be protected from out-of-network cost-sharing.

We are concerned, however, about the enforcement provision in Sec. 102 with its steep penalties and a limited safe harbor. A 30-day period to correct a violation may be an insufficient period of time for claims and patient records to be settled within the practice. **We suggest a longer period of at least 60-90 days.** We do agree that increasing transparency is critical. To the extent that it is feasible, patients receiving scheduled care should be given written and oral notice about their physician’s network status and any potential charges they could be liable for if treated by an out-of-network provider at the time of scheduling. However, the primary treating physician may not always have access to this information that is required to be provided patients. For example, while a neurosurgeon would know his/her network status, and can easily determine the status of the hospital in which a post-stabilization surgical procedure will take place, the neurosurgeon may not know in advance who will be providing all ancillary services (e.g., pathology or radiology services), making compliance with this provision impossible. In this case, it is important that any legislation **holds the treating physician harmless if he/she is not able to ascertain for the patient the network status and estimated cost of care for every provider that may contribute to the post-stabilization care of that patient.**

**Sec. 103. Resolution —Three Options**

While the AANS and CNS appreciate that you have provided a variety of potential solutions for resolving payment disputes between physicians and health plans, only one option among the three (Option 2) contains a workable framework. We will discuss each in turn.

**Subtitle A—Option 1: In-Network Guarantee**

Under this draft option, the bill requires that in-network facilities guarantee to patients and health plans that every practitioner at that facility will also be considered in-network. This can be accomplished in one of two ways: physicians can join the networks for health plans that have a network agreement with the hospital or physicians who do not have a contract with the plan can bill for their services through the hospital, rather than sending their own separate bill. In the case of emergency services, out-of-network physicians can privately negotiate their reimbursement with the plan, but if no agreement can be reached within 30 days, the plan will pay the physician the median in-network rate for services in that geographic area.

**The AANS and the CNS firmly oppose this option.** While various stakeholders, think tanks, commentators and policymakers have put forth this or some variation of this policy as a “simple” solution to the unanticipated medical bills problem, network matching or forced contracting is an unproven model that would have massive unintended consequences. Hospitals and providers separately contract with health plans for one or more insurance products, and each contract reflects its own terms and conditions, including network participation. To try and align each of these products across each hospital and any physician involved will introduce even further additional administrative complexities and have a significant negative impact on private practice physicians.
Similarly, a single hospital bundled bill is an untested and unworkable solution. This approach would be administratively complex and ignores the fundamental relationships between hospitals and physicians, which involve different contractual arrangements. Some physicians are employees, others are independent groups that contract directly with the hospital to provide certain services (e.g., emergency care), and others (e.g., neurosurgeons) merely have privileges to provide health care services at a given hospital. A single bundled payment to the hospital for all providers would be completely unworkable.

Finally, for reasons more fully discussed below, any federal benchmark payment that is based on negotiated contract rates — median or otherwise — does not reflect fair, market-based payment.

The AANS and the CNS, therefore, urge you to reject calls to include either of these solutions in any final legislation and scrap Option 1.

Subtitle B—Option 2: Independent Dispute Resolution

The AANS and the CNS believe that it is essential that legislation addressing unanticipated medical bills includes a framework for facilitating a process to quickly, efficiently and fairly resolve physician and health plan billing disputes. We are, therefore, pleased that one of the options in your draft bill includes an independent dispute resolution (IDR) process that encourages the parties to settle their disputes voluntarily, but if that is not possible, the “baseball-style” arbitration process kicks-in, whereby each party submits their suggested payment rate and the IDR entity choose between one or the other. This is organized neurosurgery’s preferred approach to resolving out-of-network payment disputes.

We would recommend, however, that you revise your draft to more closely align it with the approach taken by the State of New York — a proven solution and arguably the most comprehensive law in the country that addresses out-of-network care. While your bill does establish the IDR process, it continues to reference median in-network rates as an appropriate basis for payments. Furthermore, in only certain limited situations, would the use of an independent claims database be used to identify payment rates, but only to ascertain a median contracted rate. With some tweaks, the AANS and the CNS believe that Option 2 can be modified to establish a fair and workable solution.

According to New York’s law, which was adopted in 2015, health insurers are required to offer policies that cover at least 80% of the usual and customary cost of any out-of-network service. The law defines “usual and customary” as the 80th percentile of all out-of-network charges for the particular health care service performed by a provider in the same or similar specialty in the same geographical area as reported by an independent benchmarking database, such as FAIR Health, Inc. Because of its comprehensiveness, FAIR Health’s “usual and customary” data has become the benchmark for many different state programs across the country. Furthermore, FAIR Health’s methodology employs mechanisms to ensure that outliers in charges are eliminated from its data. It is, therefore, a more predictive indicator of actual out-of-network costs than the median in-network rates described in your draft legislation.

In addition to the formula for setting out-of-network payment rates, the New York law also sets forth an IDR system to ensure a fair process for physicians and insurers alike. This process is very straightforward and works as follows:

1. The out-of-network physician submits a claim to the health insurer.
2. The health insurer pays what it deems to be reasonable.
3. The physician can accept this amount as payment-in-full or continue to work with the insurer to privately negotiate a mutually acceptable amount.
4. If efforts to reach a privately negotiated rate are unsuccessful, either party may trigger the IDR process.
5. The IDR process utilizes “baseball-style” arbitration, whereby each party submits their suggested payment rate and the IDR entity chooses between one or the other.

Importantly, New York’s IDR process encourages reasonableness, and as part of the process, the IDR entity is required to consider the following:

- The usual and customary cost of the service, i.e., the 80th percentile of charges for that service in that region;
- Whether there is a gross disparity between the fee charged by the physician as compared to other fees paid to similarly qualified out-of-network physicians in the same region;
- The out-of-network physician’s usual charge for comparable services;
- Individual patient characteristics;
- The level of training, education and experience of the physician; and
- The circumstances and complexity of the case.

Generally, speaking, in New York the IDR entity bases its decision on which offer is closest to the usual and customary rate — underscoring the importance of the independent medical claims database as part of this process. Claims also must be resolved within 30 days of claim submission, so the process is fairly expeditious. Finally, the New York process also works well because it discourages physicians and health plans from bringing frivolous claims to the IDR entity since, by law, the “loser” pays the costs associated with the IDR. ¹

Since New York passed its surprise medical bill law, it has been viewed as a win-win-win situation according to a recent review of the New York law. ² The incidence of surprise bills decreased substantially, as did patient complaints. Additionally, physicians and insurance plans have a system that is fair, workable and transparent. For example:

- Virtually all stakeholders agree that the law has successfully helped protect consumers from surprise bills.
- State officials report a “dramatic” decline in consumer complaints about balance billing: “It’s downgraded the issue from one of the biggest [consumer concerns our call center receives] to barely an issue,” said one regulator.
- Stakeholders viewed the IDR process as fair, and as of October 2018, IDR decisions have been roughly evenly split between providers and payers, with 618 disputes decided in favor of the health plan and 561 decided in favor of the provider. However, insurers have tended to win the majority of out-of-network emergency services disputes (534-289), while providers have won the majority of surprise bill disputes (272-84).
- A 13 percent average reduction in physician payments has occurred since the law was enacted, and state regulators report that there has not been any indication of an inflationary effect in insurers’ annual premium rate filings.

¹ Note that contrary to some reported assertions, the cost of New York’s IDR process is relatively reasonable, ranging from $250 to $395.
In short, while the IDR is not perceived as “a slam dunk for either side,” observers do believe the legislation has sent a signal to insurers and providers alike to “just be reasonable and work it out amongst yourselves if you can.”

Moving forward, we hope the legislation can evolve to more closely align with New York’s law — the legislative gold standard to address out-of-network/surprise medical bills — which is working very well since it went into effect in 2015.

Subtitle C—Option 3: Benchmark for payment

Payment rates should be fair, market-based and transparent. As such, a priority of legislation developed to eliminate unanticipated medical bills and protect patients should be to provide the requisite environment and support to foster contractual arrangements between providers and payers, tempering the monopsony function of insurance. Under Option 3 of your draft bill, insurers would be required to pay the median in-network rate negotiated by health plans for the same or similar service that is provided by a physician in the same or similar specialty and provided in the geographical area region in which the medical service is furnished.

This federal payment benchmark is unacceptable and does not provide market-based payment rates. The AANS and the CNS have significant concerns that using any in-network rates as a federal benchmark, median or otherwise, will systematically undervalue physician services, disincentivize plans from negotiating in good faith with physicians and will likely increase the number of out-of-network providers. Consider the following points:

- Many physicians are in a weak bargaining position relative to commercial health insurers. According to a recent study, the majority of health insurance markets are highly concentrated and characterized by insurers with high market shares of patients.3 This increases the risk of those insurers exercising monopsony power and paying physicians below competitive levels.

  Furthermore, more than half of practicing physicians are in practices with 10 or fewer physicians and, therefore, are in a weak bargaining position relative to health insurers. This subjects physicians to “take it or leave it” contracts, with lower in-network reimbursement, which does not necessarily reflect the true market rate for provider services. Setting out-of-network payments at those discounted rates would place physicians at a competitive disadvantage when they attempt to negotiate a fair contract.

  Monopsony is particularly problematic in rural counties where there may be only one insurance carrier. If both in-network and out-of-network providers receive similarly inadequate reimbursement, determined exclusively by that insurer, that provider will be unable to continue caring for that community. This will exacerbate the pre-existing disparity in access to care for rural versus non-rural patients. Conversely, if providers in these sole insurer markets are allowed a stronger negotiating position, that will promote network participation, particularly since a contractual agreement with an insurer decreases provider collection risk and stabilizes cash flow. This improves network adequacy in not only rural markets but also the supply of providers for patients there.

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• Setting a federal benchmark at median in-network rates would also disadvantage physicians who have negotiated contracts at the higher end of the in-network payment range. In such situations, health plans would be incentivized to drop these physicians from their network knowing that the health plan would need not pay more than the median in-network rate for any resulting out-of-network care that physician may provide in the future. This would ultimately lower all in-network rates over time. Also, rather than encouraging broader provider networks, which would minimize out-of-network care/surprise bills in the first place, setting a federal benchmark rate could actually lead to more physicians being dropped from their networks.

• The median in-network rate may not adequately represent physician costs, depending on the geographic location and specialty. For example, in New York, some neurosurgeons are paying upwards of $200,000 for medical malpractice insurance. At the same time, fewer insurance companies give health plans enhanced market power. The contracted rates are not always adequate to meet basic expenses, let alone pay for a reasonable “salary” for the physicians, so some New York neurosurgeons have no choice but to practice out-of-network to pay the bills.

Rather than creating a federal benchmark payment — whether at median in-network rates or otherwise — the AANS and the CNS urge the committee to adopt the approach that New York has taken, as outlined in the discussion related to Option 2 above. While your bill recognizes the need for an independent claims database that includes noncontracted rates in certain limited circumstances, the provision ultimately fails because it still requires the plan to derive a median in-network rate from this database.

For the reasons above, the AANS and the CNS urge you to reject Option 3.

Sec. 304. Protecting patients and improving the accuracy of provider directory information

As stated in our general principles above, provider directories must be accurate and updated regularly — preferably in real time — to be useful to patients seeking care from in-network providers. The AANS and the CNS are pleased that your bill would require health plans to have up-to-date directories of their in-network providers, which should be available online or at least within 24 hours of a patient inquiry. We, therefore, support that aspect of Sec. 304.

Unfortunately, the draft bill appears to go well-beyond a requirement for health plans to provide accurate provider directories. As we read the bill, it protects patients from cost-sharing in excess of in-network cost sharing if they rely on the directory, regardless of whether the physician’s network status or information is incorrect, at the time services were provided. If a physician submits a bill to a patient with that excess amount, and the patient pays the bill, the physician must reimburse the patient who relied on that director for the excess amount, plus interest. Also, the physician may be subject to a $10,000 civil monetary penalty for violating this section of the statute. While the AANS and the CNS certainly appreciate the need to protect patients from unanticipated medical bills, particularly when they have a good faith belief that their providers are in-network based on the health plan’s directory, we do not understand why the physician is ultimately responsible for ensuring the directory accurately reflects the current network status of providers. We believe this responsibility should instead fall on the health plans and we urge you to amend your draft bill accordingly. Finally, while we appreciate the need to have an appropriate enforcement mechanism in place to ensure compliance with this provision, we believe that the use of steep civil monetary penalties in this section is excessive, particularly as they apply to physicians, and urge you to reconsider this provision.

Accurate provider directories are essential, but they do not address a more fundamental problem related to network adequacy. While your legislation is geared towards regulating unanticipated medical billing,
the bill should also address the issue of narrow networks. The practice of narrowing networks by commercial payers is a central reason physicians practice out-of-network and the root cause of many of these unanticipated medical bills. Patients increasingly face access to care barriers due to narrow health plan networks. Many times, unbeknownst to patients, entire specialties are excluded from health plans or the number and mix of specialists and subspecialists are not adequate to meet the needs of the insured population. Networks should, therefore, be sufficiently robust to ensure that an appropriate number of specialists and subspecialists per enrollee are available. Finally, decisions to remove a physician or physician group from the network without cause should not be made in the middle of a contract year.

Since the incidence of surprise medical billing is directly related to a lack of contractual agreements between insurance companies and providers, your draft legislation should be amended to ensure that insurers meet appropriate network adequacy standards — including specialists and subspecialists — so patients have timely access to the right care, in the right setting, by the most appropriate health care provider.

Sec. 305. Timely bills for patients.

According to your draft, physicians would be required to give patients a list of services received upon discharge, and all bills must be sent to the patient within 30 business days, or the patient is not obligated to pay. The AANS and the CNS agree that providers should bill patients for services rendered in a timely manner. However, we are very concerned that the requirement “to send all bills to the patient within 30 business days” is an inadequate time frame for the physician to obtain necessary information from the insurer to determine if any balance remains outstanding to be paid by the patient. Typically, physicians first bill the health plan for services rendered and then they wait for the insurer’s reply to determine what amount, if any, remains unpaid. This process can take 30 to 60 days or more to occur, making it virtually impossible for the physician to comply with the 30-day billing window in your draft. Furthermore, the civil monetary penalties of up to $10,000 per day are extremely harsh, particularly in light of the challenges that physician practices face in meeting such a rigid billing timeline.

Because of these potential penalties, we fear that more physicians will directly bill the patients the entire amount, leaving the patients responsible for submitting the bills to their insurance company. Rather than improving the billing process, this provision of your draft bill could actually lead to a more complicated billing and payment system, and would place more responsibility on the patients to facilitate physician payments. As we would like to keep the patients out-of-the middle of payment processes whenever possible, the AANS and the CNS urge you to reconsider this entire section altogether. At the very least, we urge you to revise the timeline and provide a minimum of 60 to 90 days in which to complete the billing process.

CONCLUSION

Once again, the AANS and the CNS want to thank you for providing us with an opportunity to comment on your draft legislation. Our central goal remains to protect the patient from unanticipated medical bills while ensuring that all Americans have access to the care that they need. To that end, the AANS and the CNS support protections that hold patients harmless and take them out of the middle of disputes between health plans and providers. However, as written, we believe the draft falls short because it would force physicians to accept either an already discounted in-network rate or rates that could be controlled by insurers. Such an environment creates no incentive for commercial payers to broaden their networks, which exacerbates the problem. We, therefore, urge you to amend your bill and model it more closely to New York’s law, which has proven to protect patients, lower costs and create an incentive for
commercial payers to broaden networks and ensure fair and equitable payments to physicians for out-of-network care.

We would also point out that another priority should be to ensure that health plans provide their contracted benefits to patients, which would minimize surprise bills and help patients guard against financial ruin. By some estimates, nearly 50 percent of Americans would be unable to financially withstand a $400 surprise bill without selling assets or taking on new debt. That an insured patient receives a bill despite having insurance and meeting their cost-sharing obligation is more indicative of inadequate insurance coverage than price gouging by the provider. Services like neurosurgery are inherently expensive, and the vast majority of patients depend upon the financial protection of insurance and rightfully expect it to be there when they need it.

Given the complexity and importance of this topic, we hope you will continue the ongoing dialogue with stakeholders. In the meantime, if you have any questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact us. We look forward to continuing to work with you on this and other important health policy issues.

Sincerely,

Christopher I. Shaffrey, President
American Association of Neurological Surgeons

Ganesh Rao, MD, President
Congress of Neurological Surgeons

cc: Members, HELP Committee

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